








This paper brings together and develops ideas from two Köningsbergers—Immanuel Kant and 
Hannah Arendt—on the topic of the worst political evils, which Kant calls ‘barbaric’ and Arendt 
‘totalitarian.’ Characteristic of all such political evil is that the legal-political institutions are used  
to facilitate or perpetrate wrongdoing to people subjected to their power. Both types of 
barbarism therefore involve—to use another of Arendt’s phrases in a slightly revised way—
violently denying someone else ‘the right to have rights’ to freedom in some existentially 
important regard (Arendt 1948/1973, pp. 296-8). In addition, I propose that all barbarism 
involves state-facilitated or organized absence of law and freedom as well as the presence of 
violence that seeks to make its victims suffer into numbness. Barbaric violence is therefore not 
striving to kill or enslave as such (though it often involves and leads to this too). Rather, barbaric 
violence ultimately strives to make human beings suffer so as to bring them down to a 
functioning level that may be described as existential numbness (‘living dead’), which is why 
risking lethal danger or committing suicide can present as felt ways out for those subjected to it. 
At the center of barbaric violence, there is what Kant calls a ‘depraved heart,’ or what 
Arendt describes as a striving to destroy human dignity in the name of protecting or realizing it. 
In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1948/1973), Arendt furthermore suggests that totalitarian political 
forces are, ultimately, impossible to understand by appeal to ‘the rules of common sense and self-
interest… [because they are forces] that look like sheer insanity’ (p. vii); they simply do not track 
‘humanly comprehensible motives’ (p. ix). As we see below, although modern totalitarian 
barbarism took human evil to a new level (in terms of state-organization and involvement), no 
barbaric violence ultimately makes any rational, let alone moral sense; barbarism always involves 
deeply self-deceived strivings to destroy human dignity. In fact, I show how Kant’s account of 
evil helps us capture why and how barbaric violence is always both self-deceived—aims at 
destroying human dignity in the name of protecting it—and, so, as Arendt emphasizes, involves 
striving to destroy any truthful description of reality at all (cf. Arendt 1948/73, p. 9). Barbarism 
announces itself in two ways: Perpetrators of barbaric violence are always self-deceived in that 
they always do the awful things in the name or under the guise of the good, and barbarism always 
first appears in historical societies by some social group(s) becoming unprotected against and/or 
subjected to numbing violence. In its institution, the self-deception used in barbarism typically 
involves false descriptions of what is happening, of human nature, of law (justice), and/or of 
freedom, which is also why the social groups initially targeted tend to be characterized by 
histories of dehumanization and oppression. 
More specifically, I propose that we can distinguish between four different types of 
barbaric evil, two of which may be called instances of ‘pure’ barbarism, while the other two may 
be labeled ‘totalitarian’ barbarism. I suggest that we place Kant’s own examples of barbarism in 
the category of ‘pure’ barbarism, meaning that they involve the state denying some social groups 
the legal protection needed to live safely as who they are in private and public spaces. We can 
also develop Kant’s idea by arguing that pure barbarism comes in two forms, depending on 
whether the violence is merely legally permitted (passive) or legally required (active). Exploring 
these themes is the main focus of section 1 of the paper. In contrast to ‘pure’ barbarism, I argue 
in section 2, ‘totalitarian’ barbarism not only legally permits or requires violence against some 
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groups of people, but actively and self-deceptively deploys its legal-political institutions to 
terrorize segments of its own population or (de jure or de facto) stateless or other people under 
its coercive control and thereby involves attacking the legal-political institutions themselves. 
Totalitarian barbarism can also be seen as coming in both a passive and an active form. The 
passive form centrally involves state-organized, terrorizing absence of law and freedom since it 
involves states refusing or stripping some people of their status as citizens or as persons having 
legal standing to get state protection (and potentially citizenship)—and leaving them with no 
protection and nowhere safe to go to avoid the dehumanizing violence. The second, active and 
even starker form of totalitarian barbarism involves states using its legal-political system to 
terrorize a (or some) segment(s) of its own population or stateless people(s) in a totalizing way. In 
the concluding sections of the paper, I indicate how this analysis is useful to capture central 
features of actual historical societies—past and present. 
 
1. Kant on Barbarism 
This section starts by briefly outlining Kant’s idea of ‘barbarism,’ including how it differs from 
the three other possible legal-political conditions, namely ‘anarchy,’ ‘despotism’ and ‘republic.’1 
These ideas are then to be used to identify different ways in which social groups can be deprived 
of their basic rights in actual, historical societies. Kant’s own examples of barbarism can be seen 
as pockets of ‘pure’ barbarism—a category that can be used to capture other historically 
significant examples too. Finally, Kant’s account of the predisposition to good in human nature 
(of ‘animality,’ ‘humanity’ and ‘personality’), I suggest, is particularly useful to explain why and 
how barbaric violence fundamentally aims at numbing people’s embodied, social, rational and 
moral being. 
 
1.1 From Legal-Political Ideas to Analyzing Actual, Historical Societies  
Kant proposes that three principles constitute our possible legal-political conditions: law 
(‘Gesetz’), violence (‘Gewalt’) and freedom (‘Freiheit’). These three principles, he continues, can 
be combined in four different ways, yielding four distinct (a priori) ideas of legal-political 
conditions: ‘anarchy,’ which is constituted by the principles of freedom and (provisional) law, but 
not the principle of violence; ‘despotism,’ which combines law and violence and excludes 
freedom; ‘republic,’ which involves all three principles (law, violence and freedom); and, finally, 
‘barbarism,’ which is a condition of violence and neither freedom nor law (A 7, p. 330f).2 Much 
of the secondary literature on Kant over the past couple of decades has discussed how to 
understand Kant’s claim that the postulate of public right—namely the command that if one 
cannot avoid living side by side with others, one must enter rightful conditions by establishing a 
public authority—‘can be explicated analytically from the concept of right in external relations, in 
contrast with violence (violentia)’ (MM 6, p. 307). The related (liberal republican) line of 
interpretation I find most persuasive maintains that Kant’s analysis of interactions in the state of 
nature shows that if private individuals interacting in this condition enforce their innate or private 
rights against one another, there will be an ineradicable element of unjustifiable violence.3 The 
only way to eliminate this element of violence is by postulating a public person as the omnilateral 
 
1 I explore these four conditions—including some interpretive-philosophical puzzles—in (Varden, forthcoming). 
2 Throughout this text, all of Kant’s works are referenced by means of the standard Prussian 
Academy Pagination as well as the following abbreviations: ‘A’ for Anthropology from a Pragmatic 
Point of View; ‘GW’ for Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals; ‘MM’ for The Metaphysics of Morals; 
‘R’ for Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ‘CPrR’ for Critique of Practical Reason, and TP is 
‘On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice’. R appears 
in (Kant, 1996b), A in (Kant, 2007), while the rest appear in (Kant, 1996a).  
3 For more on these interpretive traditions, see ‘Introduction to Part II’ of (Varden, 2020). 
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legal-political institutional means through which interacting persons make their rights enforceable 
against one another. Hence, public right is the establishment of rightful (public) uses of coercion 
(‘Zwang’) that forcefully limits possible interactions, is fused with laws and freedom, and is the 
contrary to violence (force that aims at limiting human interactions but that isn’t fused with laws 
and freedom). This is why Kant argues that internally (domestically) a republic solely prevents or 
‘hinders hindrances to freedom under universal’ law by subjecting all domestic interactions to 
coercive laws consistent with and required by each person’s innate right to freedom (MM 6, p. 
237). And it is why the republic’s uses of ‘force’ (‘Kraft’) or ‘power’ (‘Macht’) are correctly 
described as ‘coercion’ (‘Zwang’) that is ‘rightful’ (‘rechtlich’) because it lets laws of freedom (law 
and freedom) set terms of the coercive framework within which people can peacefully interact—
and hence Kant contrasts the republic’s use of coercion with mere ‘violence’ (‘Gewalt’) on (MM 
6, p. 231). 
What about the three other possible conditions—anarchy, despotism and barbarism? 
Anarchy is defined as the absence of violence and the presence of freedom and (provisional)4 
law, meaning that in the best of scenarios all we can achieve is the absence of injustice and the 
presence of (provisional) law and freedom. Moreover, anarchy is ‘devoid of justice’ in this 
analysis (MM 6, p. 312), because although the principles of freedom govern interactions 
(provisionally just laws that specify the a priori principles of innate and private right), they are not 
yet rightfully enforceable (conclusively just laws) (MM 6, pp. 256f, 305-313). In despotism, in 
contrast, there is law and violence—a monopoly on force used against others that is regulated by 
positive laws—but no freedom, since these laws are not grounded on universal principles of 
freedom but on contingent laws (such as various religious laws or laws grounded on a particular 
cultural interpretation). Hence, in this condition, there will either be injustice (insofar as these 
despotic laws are enforced) or prudential obligations (insofar as the positive laws concur with 
one’s conception of the good or happiness). Finally, under barbarism there is only violence and 
no law and freedom, and hence, in this condition there is necessarily destruction of embodied, 
social, rational being. In such a condition, humanity cannot be realized in its fullest form as it is 
to act freely in morally responsible ways (autonomy). To set ends in a morally responsible way is 
to set ends of one’s own in accordance with laws one gives oneself either on one’s own (virtue) 
or together with others (right). 
The above ideas enable us to identify three principled ways in which we can find 
ourselves without a legally recognized and politically protected right to freedom and, so, without 
political obligations (republic). First, we may choose to live in solitude or together with others in 
a peaceful state of nature (with no legal-political institutions whatsoever), where there happens to 
be no uses of coercion and no political obligations (anarchy). Second, we can find ourselves in a 
condition where the state’s laws are not grounded on principles of freedom but on some 
conception of the good life, and, consequently, where there are no political (but only prudential) 
obligations (despotism). Third, we can find ourselves in a condition where there is neither law 
nor freedom governing our interactions and, so, there is only violence. In such a condition, there 
are are no political obligations, and prudential obligations only reference trying to stay alive 
(barbarism).  
Notice, however, that these ideas (of anarchy, despotism, barbarism, and republic) are 
exactly that, they are ideas of reason; they do not describe complete, actual legal-political realities 
in the world or historical societies. The world we live in—in historical time—is much messier; 
actual historical societies are not identical to idealized societies that are constituted by any one of 
these ideas of reason. These ideas are therefore useful not because each accurately describes a 
different, particular historical society, but because they can capture actual political forces at work 
as well as ideals that are regulating or are supposed to regulate how we actually go about things in 
a society. It follows that actual societies may have all these forces operating at the same time—
 
4 Unless we think of law here as provisional law, these four conditions become inconsistent with Kant’s general 
theory of right. For more on this, see (Varden forthcoming). 
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where different groups participate in and/or are subjected to different forces simultaneously—
which is one reason why realizing good, just historical societies is so extraordinarily difficult. Let 
me explain.5 
To start, if people do not want to enter civil society as they would rather, and are able to, 
live peacefully together or in solitude in the state of nature, then they are not thereby wronging 
one another since no coercion (let alone violence) occurs. This is the case only if no one uses 
coercion or violence and everyone happens to agree on all matters of interaction, and hence no 
(reasonable or unreasonable) conflicts actually arise. However, if these people choose to stay in 
the state of nature or if disagreements do occur and the parties choose to fight it out or if one 
party wants to enter civil society to secure their rights and the other refuses to, then there is 
wrongdoing. In the first two scenarios they do not wrong each other, Kant argues, but they 
commit a formal wrong—a wrong in the highest degree—by refusing to interact rightfully, 
namely by refusing to establish a public rule of laws of freedom by means of which they can or 
do regulate their interactions and settle their conflicts (MM 6, pp. 307f.). In the third scenario, the 
one who is refusing to enter civil society and instead insists on fighting it out violently is also 
wronging the other person (committing both a formal and a material wrong). 
In our actual, historical societies and as a general rule, however, this is not how we 
experience anarchy. Rather, in our historical societies, sometimes we find pockets of anarchism 
when some people do not want to take part in civil society. For example, people sometimes 
choose to live together in voluntary non-conventional communes and do not want to have the 
law involved in their internal workings. Other times—and probably more common—some social 
group is denied entrance to civil society in central regard(s) by being denied access to some set(s) 
of laws as other citizens’ equals. For example, Jewish communities legally required to live in 
ghettos and only legally permitted to hold certain types of jobs in Europe throughout early 
modern/modern times, were denied access to civil society as other citizens’ equals. Moreover, 
insofar as they were able to live together peacefully, their ghetto life could be described as 
anarchic and as ‘devoid of injustice.’ In contrast, insofar as there were disputes among the people 
living in this community, any use of coercion to settle them would be at most provisionally just, 
which would happen insofar as principles of freedom were used to settle them. Also, because 
these Jewish populations were denied access to legal protection as others’ equals, the state forced 
them to stay in this condition. Hence, the people who participated in upholding or didn’t resist 
that the rule of law functioned in this way, did wrong in the highest degree and wronged the 
Jewish people formally and materially if they actively participated, and merely formally if they 
simply didn’t have the power to actively resist. 
Analogously, insofar as polyamorous or same-sex couples are denied the right to marry in 
the world today, they are denied entrance into civil society with regard to their homes and/or 
their domestic relations with their partner(s). Again, the best they can do in such situations is to 
solve all problems of interaction amicably—to maintain a situation devoid of injustice—since 
they are denied access to the legal-political apparatus (family law) to settle disputes or to find 
good ways of ending a relationship and going their separate ways. In response to this problem, if 
such outcast—what Arendt calls ‘pariah’—communities function well, they tend to be 
characterized by much welcoming affectionate love and care (communal spirit), less judgment, 
and a lack of political experience among its members. Consequently too, the process of obtaining 
more rights is commonly experienced by the members of such communities as involving losses 
 
5 I started developing this proposal for how to use the four ideas of reason when engaging historical societies in 
(Varden, 2020). Although the focus and point are different, I believe this analysis is consistent with Crenshaw’s 
(1989), Pateman’s (1988), and Mills’s (1997) idea that because much ideal theory focuses only on describing what an 
ideally just society looks like, it never makes it to the question of what our actual, oppressive societies look like. 
Hence the philosophical practice of only doing ideal theory serves to unintentionally legitimize our actual societies. I 
also hope that this essay counts as an instance of what we with Arendt and Mills can call assuming responsibility for 
being ‘pariahs’ or ‘outcast’ (Arendt) or for ‘occupying liberalism’ (Mills) in academic philosophy. 
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of a kind described so well by Arendt when she talks fondly about the Jewish community in 
Köningsberg where she grew up. In a spirit similar to Rousseau’s description of the 
transformation that happens with the establishment of morality as an orienting way for human 
beings,6 Arendt argues that becoming an active participant in legal-political society or obtaining 
freedom (gaining rights and obtaining related political experience) has a price; it involves giving 
up something valuable, namely some of the tolerant and welcoming affectionate love constitutive 
of well-functioning outcast (‘pariah’) societies.7 Similar kinds of descriptions are also common 
among people who have lived in well-functioning, pariah LGBTQIA-communities as they 
achieve rights to live and function in society at large as others’ equals, that becoming part of ‘the 
establishment’ involves an experience of communal loss. As Arendt says, freedom has its price.8 
Despotism, in contrast, does not permit freedom and, hence, the laws enforced are not 
founded in universal principles of freedom but in some particular, historical conception of the 
good life, such as captured in a historical religion or a historical culture. Indeed, Kant thinks that 
historical societies tend to start with a good dose of despotism because 
 
nature within the human being strives to lead him from culture to morality, and not (as 
reason prescribes) beginning with morality and its law, to lead him to a culture designed 
to be appropriate to morality. This inevitably establishes a perverted tendency: for 
example, when religious instruction, which necessarily should be a moral culture, begins 
with historical culture, which is merely the culture of memory, and tries in vain to deduce 
morality from it (A 7, pp. 327f).  
 
So, for example, Köningsberg in Arendt’s childhood was not only German, but the majority of 
the population also self-identified as (predominantly Lutheran) protestants and belonging to the 
Evangelical Church of Prussia. Moreover, this most powerful of social groups did not consider 
Jewish people ‘proper’ Germans since they were not protestant (Lutheran) Christians, and the 
laws in place expressed this view, too. This feature of Germany’s legal-political system was 
despotic: instead of upholding the rule of law that considered all its subjects free and equal 
citizens, some were less equal than others. Correspondingly, within the Köningsberg Jewish 
community coercion was used by Jewish leaders against its own members when their actions 
were deemed inconsistent with Jewish teachings; it was despotic insofar as they used an historical 
interpretation of the religion to decide what was im/permissible behavior. 
To illustrate, part of the reason  Arendt has quite fond memories from her childhood 
presumably tracks that she was socially well positioned in this society (given her family’s standing 
in the Jewish community and her obvious intellectual abilities) and that her way of being was in 
conformity with its dominant social views. For example, a hypothetical lesbian, radical artist 
Arendt would likely have had many fewer fond memories of her childhood since such a Hannah 
would have had to face enormous resistance from powerful forces in this conservative Jewish 
community.9 Analogously, in LGBT+ communities, there tend to be internal social norms that 
ultimately set the parameters for what is and is not permitted—something that the socially 
powerful members have a lot of say about. To extend the example, to date, some ways of being 
sexual or gendered—such as being trans or bi—have been even more difficult than being gay or 
lesbian, which appears internally connected to the fact that much socially powerful queer theory 
insists that our sexual or gendered identities are constructed all the way down. (After all, on such 
 
6 See Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality among Men and On the Social Contract, both printed in 
(Rousseau 2011). 
7 See Günter Gaus’s 1964 ‘Zur Person’ interview with Hannah Arendt: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dsoImQfVsO4&t=880s. 
8 Again, see Gaus’s interview of Arendt. 
9 Indeed, in the Gaus interview, Arendt reveals her lack of appreciation for most non-traditional ways of being a 
woman, though she also comes across as a little uncomfortable with her own views. 
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theories, it is hard to make philosophical sense of being trans or bi.) Moreover, and as I will come 
back to later in the paper, one of the disheartening characteristics of our species is that being 
seriously oppressed and violated in some regard does not entail that we will not oppress and 
violate others.  
What these examples reveal is that some of the existing states in the world are described 
by pockets of despotism. Perhaps they (de facto or de jure) require public officials to be members 
of a particular religion or public schools to teach a particular religion. For example, although only 
de facto (and not de jure), it appears practically impossible for a non-Christian to become the 
President of the USA today.10 Similarly, legal-political systems that only recognize the right to 
public holidays as determined by one or two particular religions are, in these regards, despotic. 
Living within the boundaries of these despotic laws may be prudentially obligatory for all—in 
that acting contrarily to them is too dangerous or because doing so happens to be consistent with 
obtaining happiness as one understands it—but they cannot morally oblige all since they are 
inconsistent with treating and respecting everyone as free and equal under the law. More 
generally, despotic societies are more harmonious insofar as the people living there are largely in 
agreement in their conception of what a good human life (happiness) looks like. Also, since 
culture has a strong emotional pull on us, we are likely to start forming historical legal-political 
communities with people with whom we share a basic cultural outlook. Yet, such societies 
remain despotic because such legal-political institutions are inconsistent with the idea of a 
republic, where the public authority is established and entrusted to posit, apply and uphold laws 
that enable its citizens to interact as free and equal. Indeed, if Kant is right, the danger of 
despotism in a society never goes away because ‘animality… [always] manifests itself earlier and, at 
bottom, more powerfully than pure humanity’ (which is what is realized in a ‘civil [republican] 
constitution’) and combined with our ‘self-will’11, entails that we always have an ineradicable 
temptation to ‘break out in aversion towards… [our] neighbor’ and push our ‘claim to 
unconditional freedom… [to] not merely… be independent of others, but even to be master over 
other beings who by nature are equal to [us]’ (A 7: 327). We have, in other words, an ineradicable 
temptation to turn republican legal-political institutions into despotic ones, to make others 
behave in accordance with our conception of the good, all in the name of upholding republican 
institutions of freedom and equality. 
Finally, barbarism, we remember, is the presence of violence and the absence of law and 
freedom. Kant argues that just as the never disappearing danger of despotism cannot be 
eradicated in historical societies, the threat of ‘revolutionary barbarism’—the destruction of the 
public legal-political institutions as a whole—is always also present (A 7, p. 326). Moreover, as 
mentioned in the introduction, I believe we can develop Kant’s analysis by, first, distinguishing 
between a passive and an active version of both ‘pure’ and ‘totalitarian’ barbarism. For now, the 
focus is only on ‘pure’ barbarism, where the distinction between its ‘active’ and ‘passive’ forms 
can be seen as tracking whether the violence against certain social groups is merely legally 
facilitated or also legally required. Given these distinctions, I propose that Kant’s own examples 
of barbarism are of ‘passive pure’ barbarism. Those examples include multiple wives being kept 
in a sexualized ‘kennel’ or ‘prison’ (German: ‘Zwinger’) by their shared husband (A 7, p. 304) as 
well as punishment of unwed new mothers who commit infanticide in order to avoid social 
condemnation and of officers who can defend their rightful honor only through risking their lives 
through deadly dueling (MM 6, p. 337). These passive, pure forms of barbaric laws, then, involve 
legal-political institutional frameworks that permit numbing violence by some groups of citizens 
against others without legal consequence. In my view, other historically prominent examples of 
 
10 For an overview over the religious affiliations of all the US Presidents, see https://www.potus.com/presidential-
facts/religious-affiliation/. Of 531 member of the 117th Congress (2021), 468 (88.1%) are Christian, 33 (6.2%) are 
Jewish, 18 (3.4%) do not identify or refused to answer, and 12 (2.4%) identified as some other religion 
(https://www.pewforum.org/2021/01/04/faith-on-the-hill-2021/). 
11 Below I explain how ‘self-will’ here means our capacities for setting ends of our own and our social sense of self. 
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passive, pure barbarism include various kinds of public shaming and other failures to legally and 
politically protect not only women but also sexual, gendered, disabled, racialized, ethnic, or 
religious minorities against violence by the corresponding majorities. 
This passive version of ‘pure’ barbarism can, in turn, be distinguished from a starker, 
active form of pure barbarism, according to which the legal-political targets groups of people in 
such a way that in order to stay safe they must hide who they are. For example, this public 
targeting of specific social groups includes so-called sodomy laws, laws that prohibit the exercise 
of one’s religion, and laws that require women to wear or not wear specific kinds of clothing.12 
Such pure barbarism is actively barbaric in that it involves using state power to go after women 
and/or various social minorities such that they cannot interact safely as who they are. Hence, in 
order to avoid violence, those facing it must hide who they are and behave in ways that appear to 
conform with the social norms dictated by the socially more powerful groups. Moreover, like the 
passive form, active pure barbarism also violence (and no law and freedom), but the active form 
is starker: it permits such unjustifiable violence to occur among social groups at the same time as it 
uses its monopoly of coercion to make it impossible to escape the violence, or it uses the state’s 
legal-political institutions to violate specific members of the population in numbing ways. 
 
1.2. Barbarism’s Inherent Self-Deception and Numbing Effects on Human Beings 
Before discussing totalitarian barbarism in the next section, let me address the question of why all 
forms of barbarism strive not to enslave or kill as such, but to numb other human beings under 
the guise of the good. To do so, I first sketch important aspects of Kant’s account of human 
nature that enable us to say something about the badness involved in denying others the 
possibility of realizing themselves well and about why using violence to numb others can be both 
tempting for human beings and a serious, heinous wrong for which we are morally responsible. 
Kant thinks that we have a three-fold nature consisting of ‘animality,’ ‘humanity’ and 
‘personality.’ In contrast to his predecessors, like Hobbes and Locke who think the animalistic 
principle is self-preservation, Kant conceives of self-preservation as one of three conscious, 
natural drives constitutive of our animality. The two other animalistic drives, Kant argues, are the 
sex drive and the social drive for affectionate community. Each is one prong of the three-folded 
predisposition to good in human nature, namely the predisposition to animality. All three exist as 
conscious drives as soon as we are born, and they are fundamentally grounded in our natural 
‘vital force’ (our embodied forcefulness). Moreover, each predisposition is enabled by a relational 
category of the understanding—namely substance (self-preservation), causality (sex drive) and 
community (affectionate community)—which must here be understood teleologically, namely as 
orienting a newborn’s ability to act in accordance with pleasures and pains that enables it to 
function as a good, forceful whole. To illustrate, from the moment they are born, human babies 
preserve themselves by eating until they are full (until it is no longer pleasant to eat), they respond 
with pleasure to relatively gentle, small amounts of physical human touch (the sex drive), and 
they are comforted by being held close and talked to in loving, affectionate ways (community). 
These activities do not require reasoning as such, but they can be and are partially developed by 
means of associative thinking, which we see, for example, in how babies begin to associate 
certain smells and sounds with pleasures, etc. 
In addition, however, that (only) human babies scream when they are born, Kant 
proposes, can be explained philosophically only if we attribute an additional capacity for 
representation to human babies as compared to non-human animal newborns, namely a 
frustration over not being able to act, to be free (A 7, p. 268). With time, this rational capacity is 
 
12 Given the analytical framing of this paper, using the concept of law here can be misleading (in that it can easily be 
assimilated with despotism and not barbarism). Hence, notice that in important ways, these «laws» don’t function as 
proper laws. For example, sodomy ‘laws’ are characteristically sham laws in that they are not upheld against all 
populations equally but are used to target members of the LGBT+ community, and not all practices of sodomy 
(such as those practiced by straight people). 
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the one that is developed, Kant famously argues, by humans learning to act on maxims 
(subjective rules of action) by means of which humans set ends of their own. (More on this 
shortly.) Within a short time, human babies will also start to interact with loved ones through 
smiling and crying, however. As the scream expresses pain (frustration at not being able to act) 
and the crying a need for togetherness (to restore the unity as experienced inside the womb), the 
smile reveals a social sense of self and their smiles express their pleasant awareness of being seen 
by another and that the other is happy to be seen by them. Hence, in contrast to Rousseau who 
deems the social sense of self (amour propre) as originally only bad, Kant deems being seen by 
another as originally a good thing. 
Both kinds of representation—of freedom and of a social sense of self—constitute the 
predisposition to humanity (‘rationality’), or what Kant also refers to above (A 7, p. 327) as ‘self-
will.’ Moreover, in order to develop this predisposition well, human beings need to develop their 
capacity to reason. In short, human babies must learn to set ends of their own by mastering 
acting on universalizable maxims—which requires reflective self-consciousness and mastering 
abstract concepts—and they must learn to manage social emotions that involve comparison, such 
as winning and losing, envy, and jealousy. Finally—and this is where Kant distinguishes himself 
from all his predecessors—in order to be able to act morally responsibly, human beings must 
learn to act as motivated by their practical reason. That is to say, they must be able to act as 
motivated by moral reasons, by whether or not a certain action is right or wrong, and this is 
difficult because our animality and ‘self-will’ develop earlier and so easily and strongly motivate 
us. To put this point in Kantianese, to act morally responsibly is to act consistent with respect 
for, and insofar as possible supportive of, oneself and others as rational beings, as beings who 
have the capacity to set ends of their own and consequently must be treated as ends in 
themselves (not mere means) or as having dignity (a pricelessness). To be able to act as motivated 
by this ought—to do something just because it is the right thing to do and to refrain from doing 
something just because it would be wrong—is to have developed the third predisposition, namely 
to personality (moral responsibility). Developing personality requires us not only to master 
reasoning, but to heed what our reasoning says about the rightness or wrongness of an action 
(regardless of what we want to do). It requires us to develop our ‘moral vital force.’ 
Consequently, it takes us (human beings) a long time to develop our animality, humanity and 
personality into an integrated whole for which we are able to assume moral responsibility. 
Moreover, this whole can be divided into two components: one component that constitutes our 
happiness (rational end-setting grounded on and consistent with our animality and humanity) and 
one that constitutes our morality (ensuring that our actions are consistent with and supportive of 
a moral world).13 The highest good (aim) for us in actual, human lives is therefore to bring these 
two parts—happiness and morality—into as close a union as possible (TP 8, p. 279, CPrR 5, pp. 
110-115) and, hence, also, to bring our ‘natural’ and our ‘moral’ vital forces into harmonious 
union.14 
 In addition to his idea of the predisposition to good, Kant’s theory of human nature 
contains an account of our propensity to evil. In short, on my preferred interpretation, Kant 
proposes that evil is something we bring upon ourselves through our capacity for choice (setting 
ends of our own). Evil is furthermore seen as coming in three degrees—‘frailty,’ ‘impurity’ and 
‘depravity’—where moving from one degree to the next, from frailty to impurity or from 
impurity to depravity, means that we lose our way in life in significantly more complex ways (and, 
correspondingly, healing becomes more difficult subjectively). More specifically, frailty refers to 
an instance or an area of our life where we are likely to do wrong, impurity to an emotionally 
unstable pattern of motivations determining our actions, and depravity to a striving to weaken 
 
13 See Kant (R 6, pp. 26-28) for his account of the predisposition to good in human nature and see (Varden, 2020) 
for my interpretation of his account. 
14 For an excellent interpretation of why Kant thinks that going about our lives in this way makes rational sense even 
when we deserve to be morally happy, but are not, see (Deligiorgi, 2020). 
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our subjective susceptivity to act morally (our moral force). Regarding the latter, Kant proposes 
that a depraved heart always involves adopting ‘evil maxims’ and ‘reversing the ethical order as 
regards the incentives of a free power of choice’ in a self-deceptive manner (since humans do not 
have a ‘diabolical’ will) (R 6, pp. 29f.). A depraved heart, in other words, always involves acting 
on a non-moral motivation. Consequently, it becomes subjectively harder and harder to do the 
right thing (true or morally responsible exercises of freedom) as one strives only to do what 
makes one feel most happy or excited or powerful (perverted uses of freedom). Moreover, 
feeling the most happy or excited or powerful involves describing what one does by means of 
moralized language (doing bad or even awful things in the name of doing good, even heroic 
things).15 Finally, both actions of frailty and of impurity can be undertaken in self-deceived or 
non-self-deceived ways, whereas a depraved heart always involves self-deception. 
In light of the above, we can see how Kant combines his idea of a depraved heart with 
the vices that can be grafted onto the predisposition to humanity in order to identify ‘diabolical 
vices,’ vices that capture the worst we humans can do (R 6, p. 27). Kant describes such diabolical 
destructive violence as rooted in an ‘anxious endeavor’ to obtain a ‘hateful superiority’ over 
others (R 6, p. 27). Moreover, he thinks diabolical vices can be called ‘vices of culture,’ since they 
attach to the predisposition to humanity (end-setting and a social sense of self), and they are 
characterized by an ‘extreme degree of malignancy [, namely] … a maximum of evil that 
surpasses humanity… e.g. in envy, ingratitude, joy in others’ misfortune, etc.’ (R 6, p. 27). In other 
words, these evils ‘surpass’ humanity in that they are not fully comprehensible by, as Arendt also 
says, common sense, rational self-interest, or humanly comprehensible motives. Hence, these 
evils are at war with, or cannot sustain, human life in any sense of the word as they are the 
(profoundly irrational) undoing of it. Important too as we set out to explore the nature of 
barbarism, notice Kant’s proposal that ‘[a]n evil heart can coexist with a will which in the abstract 
is good. Its origin is the frailty of human nature, in not being strong enough to comply with its 
principles, coupled with its dishonesty’ (R 6, p. 37). In other words, the first step towards 
depravity is always frailty—as this is the lowest level of evil—and it is always developed by giving 
up on the project of being truthful. Or to put the point from the other direction, evil always 
involves not knowing what or why one does what one does (R 6, p. 37), or what Kant elsewhere 
calls the duty to know one’s heart (MM 6, p. 441).16 
 As we have seen, Kant thinks that trailing our animalistic drive and our drive for freedom 
is an anxiety—a ‘self-will’—that makes it tempting for us to want to dominate others rather than 
to want to spend our energy on setting challenging and good ends of our own. Why is this the 
case? One reason is that our social sense of self involves a deep vulnerability because, in Kant’s 
words, it makes it subjectively tempting for us to view ourselves as happy or unhappy only relative 
to how happy others are. And that makes it possible for us to feel happier simply because others 
are less happy, which also means we have a vulnerability to dislike or even hate others insofar as 
they are happy and to take pleasure in bringing others down (make them miserable). Moreover, 
 
15 See Kant (R 6, p. 28-45) for his account of the propensity to evil in human nature, and (Varden 2020) for my fuller 
interpretation of his account. 
16 In my view, a brilliant recent dramatization of a depraved heart that is in the abstract good is the character Elena 
Richardson in Little Fires Everywhere,  a tv miniseries based on Celeste Ng’s novel by the same title. Richardson tells 
herself a story, according to which she is aiming at the good, but in fact she is fundamentally unable to be truthful. 
She doesn’t know herself (her own heart), and she cannot bring herself to genuinely respect herself or others’ as 
having dignity, which gives itself expression in much racism, sexism, and heterosexism as well as much oppressive 
and damaging behavior towards everyone around her—a realization she has at the end where she argues that 
although it is the children who literally lit their home on fire, ultimately it is she who has burned it down. In many 
ways, we can see the efforts of those who care about Ms. Richardson as trying to make her be more truthful in her 
descriptions of herself, those around her, and her life in general. She is, in Kant’s phrase, in the abstract good, but 
her lack of truthfulness makes it impossible for her to live in a good way (for herself, in relation to anyone else, or 
generally.) The contrast to such a depraved heart (that is in the abstract good) would be one that is not abstractly 
good, but bad or aimed at destruction of human dignity, such as that expressed in a white supremacist’s characteristic 
thought and action. 
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as we saw, Kant proposes that this vulnerability can exist together with a generally or abstractly 
good heart, a heart that generally strives to do good. For example, as some of the writings on 
what Robin DiAngelo (2018) usefully has called ‘white fragility’ emphasize, many white people 
who benefit from and participate in practices that uphold racialized hierarchies (without being 
generally upset about it or resisting how the related interactions proceed), typically, upon 
reflection, firmly believe racism is bad. Similarly, one might point to how interactions that involve 
relating to other social groups as less than one’s own often are accompanied by the reflective 
thought that all social groups are equal. Kant argues that these are ways in which our depraved 
hearts operate. Indeed, we might add that we saw it in Kant himself: he harbored and expressed 
many racist, sexist and heterosexist17 thoughts and feelings, and yet he was also deeply committed 
to understanding morality in terms of freedom and equality. It is, in other words, very tempting 
to have the world function in such a way that regardless of what we do or do not do, we are still 
better (off) and have more power than others, just by virtue of our (often inherited) social 
identities. 
To see this from another angle, when we are unsuccessful at setting and achieving ends of 
our own, it becomes tempting not to try harder but instead to focus our energy on having others 
do it for us. However, such low self-esteem also opens up a much worse temptation, namely to 
simply start channeling our energy towards bringing others down psychologically (so that they 
don’t feel good about their own accomplishments) or doing what we can to make sure that they 
fail too. In fact, such a depraved point of view will see as threatening any expression of 
independent spontaneity—of flourishing animalism, humanity, or personality. That is to say, for 
someone who has lost their way in this way, the very fact that there is expression of another’s 
independent being—of flourishing animalistic life, of freedom, of a healthy sense of self, or of 
moral care—is experienced as upsetting (anxiety inducing) by a depraved heart; the drive of such 
a heart is to crush any such spontaneous—happy or moral—expressions. And to do that, one 
needs to make the others suffer by making them focus their energy and attention on not 
expressing themselves spontaneously in independent ways at all and instead exist only to affirm 
one’s own sense of self. The fundamental striving of diabolical evil is, in other words, ultimately 
to make others exist as the living dead, the residue of persistent numbing violence. 
Yet another way to see this complex irrational side of ours begins by noting the 
following: to create something that is truly good and/or right and/or beautiful—to create 
being—is difficult (even if deeply meaningful and satisfying). In contrast, to destroy things 
(destroy being) is relatively easy. Hence, we are liable to go for the latter—to feel powerful by 
destroying or belittling what others are or make—instead of trying for the former. To express 
this point in an even more abstract way, being necessarily precedes non-being. That is, only if 
something exists can we destroy it, and destroying something is not to make something else, 
though we are tempted to act as if this were the case because destroying something can create a 
strong sense of self, a subjective sense of being very powerful. People who do horrible things to 
others, for example, are liable to present what they are doing as just or as more impressive than 
those who are creating things: sexing up wrongdoing and wrongdoers is a real temptation for us. 
To use a famous illustration in the Kant literature, Kant argues that stealing presupposes property 
in that we can only steal if there is something to be stolen; a maxim of stealing cannot hold as a 
universal law, whereas a maxim of property can. Stealing, therefore, cannot be a principle of 
reason—of being—as it is inherently parasitic on the principle of property. These two 
principles—property and stealing—cannot take each other’s place; the latter presupposes the 
former, but not vice versa. Only property is constitutive of rational being—something that is—
stealing is not (as it only aims at destroying rational being or something that is).18 
Let me illustrate this also with regard to the three degrees of evil: On a bad day, I may, 
for example, respond with no interest or disinterest to something beautiful a friend shows me. 
 
17 In Kant’s case, his heterosexism probably also expresses self-hatred. For more on this, see (Varden, 2020). 
18 For example, see Kant’s discussion of universalizable maxims (GW 4, p. 402). 
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Usually, I respond appropriately and don’t find it hard to do so, but today I’m grumpy and so I 
fail, and I hurt my friend. This is frailty. Alternatively, I may have let myself develop a patterned, 
emotional problem with feeling envy. Now, whether or not I respond appropriately to my 
friends’ beautiful creations is a rather accidental affair since it always depends on how good I feel 
about myself. This is impurity. Both of these ways of acting may or may not involve self-
deception: With frailty, if I am self-deceived, I may tell myself that my friend is inconsiderate in 
showing me the beautiful thing exactly today (since, surely, she must/ought to know that this is a 
day when I need some serious TLC). If not self-deceived, then I may realize that my emotions 
are very unruly right now, but even so I yield to the temptation to treat my friend badly. Similarly, 
with impurity, I may or may not be aware that I have a problem with envy—and being unaware 
(self-deceived) is worse, in the sense of harder to fix. Finally, I may have developed a depraved 
heart, in which case exactly how I respond to my friend’s art is always tailored to what will 
maximize my sense of self in the moment. If it will make me feel powerful and excited by 
belittling her art, then that’s what I will do, but if it feels good to charm her with compliments, 
then that is what I will do. What I will not do is to strive to make sure that I am around my friend 
and her art in a way that expresses my deep appreciation of and respect for her and her art—and 
regardless of how I act, I am never bothered that perhaps I acted wrongly (unlovingly and 
disrespectfully). Realizing my own ill treatment of others and the reasons for it is humbling—and 
being humbled is exactly what I strive to avoid; after all, all of this bad behavior comes exactly 
from a place of low self-esteem, of putting others down because one feels bad about oneself and 
one wants to avoid that feeling. In the Anthropology, Kant relatedly argues that treating others in 
this way is arrogance, which he defines as ‘… the unjustified demand on another person that he 
despise himself in comparison to others… [and] such a thought cannot enter the head of anyone 
except one who feels ready to debase himself’ (A 7, p. 273, cf. MM 6, pp. 465f). 
 If we now return to the above examples of pure barbarism, we can see how they all 
involve strivings to numb others, something that is only possible insofar as our own pleasures 
and pains are, in some regard, out of balance due to a lack of both a healthy sense of self and of 
truthfulness. Correspondingly, our susceptivity to moral feeling (our moral vital force) is weak. 
This analysis fits well with Kant’s examples of sexualized prisons or kennels for women, women 
who face a condition of either social annihilation or infanticide, and soldiers who must either face 
the lethal threat of a duel or be socially shamed. In all these cases, the social forces and the legal-
political institutions are so arranged that some people (the many wives, the women who get 
pregnant outside of wedlock, the insulted soldiers) must not affirm themselves as free and equal 
relative to members of other social groups (the husband, the married people, the other soldiers) 
or they will face extreme social consequences. If they do affirm themselves as free and equal, 
then they will be subjected to coercion or, ultimately, violence aimed at numbing this desire to 
behave in ways that express themselves as full of vitality (animality), as honorable (sociality), and 
as free to set their own ends (humanity)—and with the presumption of moral responsibility 
(personality). And, so, choosing the extreme becomes viewed as a possible, albeit terrible, way 
out, namely infanticide, a sheer provider of sexual services, or accepting the duel. As mentioned, 
I believe that other barbaric ways in which women as well as sexual, gendered, ethnic, racialized, 
or religious minorities often have been or are being treated are similar in that the oppressive 
forces strive to numb them, to threaten members of these groups to be ashamed of their own 
animalistic embodiment, to view themselves as inherently dishonorable in virtue of who they are, 
as not entitled to be as free as others, and as not capable of moral responsibility. And there 
simply is no moral, good way out for them. 
Hence, such barbaric legal-political systems either facilitate the practice of non-oppressed 
members of society to act coercively or violently (without legal consequence) insofar as necessary 
to keep these people numb in their expressions (passive pure barbarism) or involve actively using 
the legal-political institutions to make people hide who they are or their defining behaviors and 
practices (active pure barbarism)). Ultimately, such oppression strives to make others feel and 
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behave as if they do not have dignity—as beings who do not set ends of their own and who do 
not deserve to be treated with respect—and this is done by attacking any self-assertion of 
another, whether animalistic, social, free, or moral, that reveals a presumption of a right to 
consider themselves as valuable and as equal. And the only way to explain this philosophically 
goes via a lack of truthfulness and a lack of a stable social sense of self for the oppressing people. 
It is this toxic mix that allows this destructive anxiety to get hold of the legal-political institutions 
through self-deception. After all, such destruction is not the declared, intentional aim of the legal-
political institutions; this destruction is done in the name of the good and justice. Consequently, 
acting in this way is possible only if we have weakened our susceptivity to moral feeling by 
orienting towards ourselves and others without a fundamental commitment to truthfulness and 
dignity. And weakening our susceptivity to act in ways respectful of others as our equals is 
achieved by having dehumanized them, by having told oneself a story according to which they 
are perverted or not as human as we are. (More on this below.) In so doing,  in a Kantian 
analysis, those who dehumanize fail to heed their conscience (MM 6, pp. 400f.), because 
conscience is understood as the awareness of ‘an internal court in the human being (“before which 
his thoughts accurse or excuse one another”)’ (MM 6, pp. 400f.). And just like moral feeling (our 
susceptivity to morality’s commands), our conscience is a feature of ours that we cannot destroy 
but only weaken significantly by developing certain patterns of thoughtless feeling (affect) and 
hateful thought (passion) that makes it easier to block it or feel it only weakly (respectively) (MM 
6, pp. 400f.). And it is, ultimately, because we cannot destroy our conscience—as it is enabled by 
our ability to use practical reason and, so, to be morally responsible for our actions—that we are 
responsible for our wrongdoing, including awful, heinous wrongdoing. We could have done 
better; we did always have resources internal to ourselves that we chose not to use but to block 
or had numbed when we engaged in the wrongdoing. Wronging others always also is to wrong 
ourselves and comes from places of emotional damage. 
Notice too that we can now explain why it is the case that truly awful wrongdoing always 
involves self-deception. That is to say, when we do awful things to others, we are self-deceived in 
that we describe the situation incorrectly. Typically, the language used involves dehumanization, 
meaning that we describe the social groups as, somehow, perverted or evil human beings. Often 
when we do, we describe others in animalistic terms that makes them both more like animals or 
also as perverted animals—as too and wrongly self-concerned (e.g. secretly and conspiratorially 
trying to pervert, destabilize, or take over the world), as too sexual (really liking sex) or liking 
sexual wrongly (such as by not liking submissive sex or by liking non-straight sex), or as too and 
wrongly affectionate (as incapable of reasoning). The reason why we do this is because of how 
our reasoning powers work. Insofar as we involve our reasoning powers at all (and don’t block 
them by acting in affective, feeling ways)—which we always do in barbaric violence as it is 
sustained violence aimed at numbing others—the way our reasoning powers track the 
fundamental distinction between being and non-being entails that when we act destructively, we 
bring our minds around by describing ourselves or others as if we or they are perverted—we or 
they are non-being or trying to destroy being—and hence are subjected to ‘corrective’ uses of 
force (uses that protect being). The more self-deceived we are—so that the more barbaric our 
wrongdoing is and the more depraved our hearts are—the more we speak of ourselves and our 
projects as expressing great moral heroism; indeed, even appealing to being itself (‘God’) is 
something we are liable to do. Correspondingly, being subjected to terrible evil is commonly 
experienced as involving both failing fundamentally to uphold dignity in our interactions with 
others and as requiring us to hold onto ourselves by appealing to our dignity understood as 
something we have in virtue of being a human being and that no one can take away.19 
 
19 For some powerful accounts of this struggle, see Douglass (1855/2016), Améry (2009), Brison (2011), Kashua 
(2016), and Ghamari (2016). 
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2. Totalitarian Barbarism 
Turning to totalitarian barbarism, my proposal is that totalitarian barbarism presupposes or 
necessarily comes after pure barbarism in historical time and that the main difference between 
them concerns the way in which legal-political institutions are used as means of violent 
wrongdoing. Insofar as actual states are characterized by pockets of pure barbarism, they legally 
permit and/or require numbing violence against certain social groups. In contrast, actual states 
characterized by totalitarian violence use the legal-political institutions to attack the legal-political 
institutions themselves—participate in their own destruction—by making them deprive groups of 
subjects of their basic rights and subject them to totalizing violence under the guise of upholding 
law and freedom. Hence, totalitarian barbarism has the power to destroy the entire legal-political 
system since it involves using the institutions as the means of their own destruction. Where pure 
barbarism facilitates the use of violence that strives to destroy persons as who they are in some 
basic regard (e.g. sexual, gender, or religious identities), totalizing barbarism actively uses violence 
to undermine the idea that persons, as such, have a right to exist at all—and in so doing, 
totalitarianism turns the violence into a destruction of the legal-political system as such.  
Totalitarian violence also comes in two forms: a passive form that can be described as a 
state-organized, terrorizing absence of law and freedom since it involves states refusing or 
stripping some people of status as citizens or as persons having legal standing to get state 
protection (and potentially citizenship) and leaving them with nowhere good to go; they are, as 
Arendt says, denied the ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt 1948/1973, pp. 296-8). Historical examples 
include20 Norway’s original constitution of 1814, according to which Jews and Jesuits were not 
permitted to enter the territory, and European states’ treatment of the Roma people in modern 
times. They also include cases where states have stripped some of their citizens of citizenship, 
such as Nazi-Germany’s stripping its Jewish population of their citizenship and the UK’s 
stripping segments of its (especially Caribbean) population of their right to citizenship (the 
‘Windrush scandal’). Passive, totalitarian barbarism also includes states that have or are denying 
refugees a safe haven, such as European states’ denial of entry to stateless people after WW1 and 
many states’ current denial of entrance for stateless people and refugees onto their territory 
which leaves them with no safe place to be or go. 
The second, active and even starker form of totalitarian barbarism involves a state using 
its legal-political system to terrorize a (or some) segment(s) of its own population, stateless 
people(s), or peoples under its de facto control in a totalizing way. Historical examples of this 
starkest form include European colonialization, Antebellum slavery in the Unites States, Western 
countries’ schools for indigenous people’s children in the 20th century, Apartheid South Africa’s 
treatment of its non-white, especially Black populations, Nazi-Germany’s concentration death 
camps for Jewish people, the disabled, the Roma people, LGBT+, and various states’ historical 
terrorizing treatment of indigenous peoples, states’ historical uses of mental hospitals to 
‘medically treat’ LGBT+ persons and ‘loose’ (sexually ‘promiscuous’) women, current Black mass 
incarceration in the USA, the USA’s current separation and incarceration of refugees and 
immigrants’ children, European current refugee camps in Southern Europe, some of Israel’s 
military engagements with Palestinians and on the Palestinian territories, US prison facilities at 
Guantanamo Bay, and China’s Xinjiang ‘re-education camps’ for its Muslim populations. This 
last, starkest form of totalitarian barbarism, as mentioned above, has the potential to bring the 
entire legal-political system into total self-destruction since these legal-political practices are at 
war with the foundational principles of justice. Consequently, once these legal-political violences 
set the framework within which everything else functions, the legal-political system is brought 
into active self-destruction. Moreover, because it is a self-deceived project of destruction, it is not 
accidental that as totalitarian violent forces become increasingly totalizing, the official institutions 
increasingly become a public sham whose main purpose is to create a sense of normalcy in the 
 
20 I use the examples below to illustrate the general principle, not as an exhaustive list. My knowledge of the history 
of various states around the world is insufficient to give representative examples from around the globe.  
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world while the real uses of state force become hidden in a violently destructive and increasingly 
more powerful secret police and military forces. The first time we saw this happen was in Nazi-
Germany and Stalinist USSR: the Nazi death camps and Stalin’s genocide of millions of its own 
people by means of its own legal-political institutions and on its own territory are logical 
outcomes of such state-organized, self-deceived self-destruction. 
Concluding Remarks 
In the ways indicated above, the theoretical resources left us by Kant and Arendt are useful to 
capture some of the moral psychological and phenomenologically patterned aspects of both 
dehumanizing oppression and violence. Let me close by noting some ways in which the above 
analysis provides us with philosophical resources for speaking to emotional challenges facing us 
insofar as we live within emotionally stunted and stunting legal-political institutional frameworks. 
To start, the above analysis provides us with theoretical resources with which we can give 
philosophical accounts of why and how living in legal-political conditions that facilitate barbarism 
tend to be emotionally stunting. They can capture why the repercussions of these barbaric 
wrongdoings live on as intergenerational trauma in the families of those subjected to the 
wrongdoing, in the families of those actively resisting it, in the families of the wrongdoers, and in 
the societies of all involved, and why it is typically truly difficult to stop the resulting patterns of 
self- and other emotionally arrested or destructive behaviors in the next generations. After all, 
these behaviors were originally triggered in efforts to survive lethal dangers (survivors and 
resistance fighters) or to self-deceptively abandon human dignity as the fundamental orienting 
principle of how one goes about one’s life (wrongdoers). These behaviors and reactive patterns 
are neither easy to control nor to manage by reflective cognitive powers since they, in part, 
function either at the merely reflexive level (survivors) or are deeply self-deceived (wrongdoers). 
In addition, notice that all barbaric violence both starts as ‘pockets’ of barbarism in 
historical societies and is self-deceived in that its legal-political institutions are used to create the 
absence of protection or the destruction of humanity (law and freedom) in the name of 
protecting or enabling it. Barbarism always involves, in other words, ‘normalized,’ yet 
fundamentally perverted and self-deceived uses of law and freedom. Kant’s account of the 
propensity to evil helps us see different ways in which people can be tempted to participate in 
oppression and wrongdoing, and to see a distinction between formal and material wrongs to 
capture some of the moral complexity facing those subjected to inescapable wrongdoing. 
Moreover, the active, stark form of totalitarian barbarism has the potential to destroy the entire 
legal-political system because the actual uses of violence are self-deceptively attacking the 
institutions of law and freedom—the very notion of human dignity as our fundamental orienting 
moral force—domestically (as it did in the Apartheid South Africa and the Antebellum South) or 
also in other countries (especially European colonialism in Africa) or the world (which happened  
within Nazi-Germany and Stalinist USSR). If these destructive forces are not stopped—by the 
civil war and later civil rights movements in the US, by the eradication of Apartheid in South 
Africa, by the Allies in World War II—then that legal-political system becomes untenable. 
Paradoxically, therefore, although all barbarism always involves attacking socially weak groups by 
state (passive or active) means, once it transforms into its starker totalitarian forms, it is either 
stopped or it will destroy the legal-political institutions from within. As Arendt told us in 1943: 
‘The comity of the European peoples went to pieces when, and because, it allowed its weakest 
member to be excluded and persecuted’ (Arendt 1943/2008, p. 274). Which is not to say that 
those who face the less stark versions of barbarism are facing something easy. Bat-Ami Bar On 
(2019) reminds us of this point in her work on fascism by emphasizing that regardless of which 
version of it—‘lite’ ones or not—‘There is, of course, nothing lite about it for those who are its 
targets’ (Bar on 2019: 12).  
Finally, even if the starkest totalitarian forces are stopped, this does not mean that society 
automatically moves on without barbaric violence. Because barbarism is only possible against a 
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background of serious dehumanization of some social groups by others, pockets of passive 
totalitarian or pure barbarism typically remain even after state-organized totalizing barbarism is 
defeated. That is to say, World War II stopped Nazi-Germany’s totalitarian project; European 
colonialization ended; the US Civil War ended legalized slavery; Apartheid South Africa fell; 
women and sexual and gendered minorities are slowly gaining rights many places in the world. 
And yet it would be plainly wrong to claim an end to pockets of barbaric violence and oppression 
of Jewish people, women, racialized groups, polyamorous and LGBTQIA communities, religious 
groups, or ethnic groups even after the end of these important active, state-organized uses of 
totalitarian violence. Europe continues to struggle with serious racism—including Anti-Semitism 
(now against both Jewish and Muslim populations)—and in recent years, refugees are held in 
internment camps by individual states or in Europe-organized ones in the south. LGBTQIA, the 
Roma people, and disabled people did not obtain equal rights (de jure or de facto) after WW2; 
they still haven’t in many European countries. The US is still torn apart by and unable to 
overcome deep social and institutional dysfunctions involving barbaric racist violence, including 
as revealed by horrific statistics in relation to Black mass incarceration and police violence against 
Black populations, and the extraordinary lack of non-white people in powerful public and private 
institutions. And if all of this were not sufficiently sad, utterly disheartening is the fact that social 
groups that really do know—either themselves or their recent ancestors—the pains and suffering 
involved in being dehumanized, can themselves engage in the same or similar treatment of other 
social groups or sub-groups within their own populations. For example, some of Israel’s 
engagements on the Palestinian territories, especially in relation to the expansive settlements and 
the Gaza-strip, remove any delusion that knowing barbaric violence in the first person as such 
entails that we will not engage in any kind of it ourselves. Conversely, some Muslims, including 
Palestinians, do not focus their anger at Israel’s oppressive and unjustifiable policies against 
Palestinians, but instead convert their frustration into violent Anti-Semitism. The statistics on 
barbaric, including sexualized violence against women and sexual or gendered minorities, 
including internally to otherwise oppressed societies, such as inside African American or Latinx 
populations in the US or among Black populations in South Africa, are similarly, utterly 
disheartening. One last example: some feminists oppress and harass some women, such as 
women who don’t fit their conceptions of what enlightened womanhood is. Traditionally, the 
main target has been women who are very much on the femme side of things and women sex 
workers, while, most recently, their main target has been women who are trans. The above 
account can speak to all of this, to how being subjected to horrific dehumanizing violence does 
not, in itself, result in wisdom around these tremendously difficult aspects of human life and why 
the truthfulness and resulting transformation required for such wisdom to arise are such 






Améry, Jean (2009): At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Arendt, Hannah (1958/1998). The Human Condition, 2nd edition. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
----- (1948/1973): The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. 
------  (1943/2008): ‘We Refugees.’ In The Jewish Writings, ed. Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman, 
New York: Schocken Books, pp. 264-274. 
Bar on, Bat-Ami (2019): ‘But Is It Fascism?’ Journal of Social Philosophy, 50(4): 407-424. 
Belle, Kathryn Sophia (formerly Gines, Kathryn T.) (2014): Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Brison, Susan (2011): Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Crenshaw, Kimberlé (1989): ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 1989 (1): 139-167.  
Deligiorgi’s, Katerina (2020): ‘Kant, Schiller, and the idea of a moral self’. Kant-Studien, 111 (2): 
303-322. 
DiAngelo, Robin (2018): White Fragility: Why It’s So Hard For White People To Talk About Racism. 
Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 
Douglass, Frederick (1855/2016): My Bondage and My Freedom. In The Portable Frederick Douglass. 
New York: Penguin Classics. 
Ghamari, Behrooz (2016): Remembering Akbar: Inside the Iranian Revolution. OR Books. 
Kant, Immanuel (1996a). Practical Philosophy, transl. and ed. by Mary J. Gregor. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kant, Immanuel (1996b). Religion and Rational Theology, transl. and ed. by Allen W. Wood and 
George di Giovanni. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kant, Immanuel (2007). Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View in Anthropology, History, and 
Education, ed. by Robert B. Louden and Günter Zöller, transl. by Mary Gregor, Paul Guyer, 
Robert B. Louden, Holly Wilson, Allen W. Wood, Günter Zöller, and Arnulf Zweig. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kashua, Sayed (2016): Native Native: Dispatches from an Israeli-Palestinian Life. Grove Press. 
Mills, Charles (1997): The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Pateman, Carol (1988): The Sexual Contract. Oxford, UK: Polity Press. 
 
 17 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (2011). The Basic Political Writings, transl. and ed. by Donald A. Cress. 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 
Varden, Helga (forthcoming): ‘Kant’s Four Legal-Political Conditions.’ Norsk Filosofisk 
Tidsskrift/Norwegian Journal of Philosophy. 
----- (2020): Sex, Love, and Gender: A Kantian Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
